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RETENTION OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA: SECURITY VS PRIVACY
~.!:1 Itb ~8~k...qr NUtIr/J--
I. Introduction
The EU Electronic Privacy Directive 20021 requires Member States to ensure the
con~dentiali~ of commllll:ications. It prohibits. listening, tapping, storage or other kinds
of interception or surveillance of communications.f The communications service
providers are obligated to delete all traffic data no longer required for the provision of a
communications service.3 Yet, Member States are permitted to restrict the scope of this
protec~ion to safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the prevention
Investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 4 '
Despite strong criticism by privacy experts, data protection commissioners, civil liberties
roups and the ISP industry, a provision on the retention of communications data has
een inserted. This new Directive reverses the position under the 1997
Telecommunications Privacy Directive by explicitly allowing the EU countries to compel
ntemet Service Providers and telecommunications companies to record, index and store
their subscribers' communications data.5 Under the terms of the new Directive, Member
States may now pass laws mandating the retention of traffic and location data of all
cO~munications. 6 Article 15 of the Directive provides that Member States may adopt
legislative measures when such restrictions constitute a necessary, appropriate and
proportionate measure within a democratic society) Specifically, Member States may
adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a limited period. 8
II. The Emergence of the Electronic Privacy Directive
In July 2000, the European Commission issued a profosal for a new directive on privacy
10 the electronic communications sector. The proposa was introduced as a part of a larger
Phackage of the telecommunications directives aimed at strengthening competition within
t .e European electronic communications markets. As originally proposed, the new
directive would have strengthened privacy rights for individuals by extending the
protections that were already in place for telecommumcatJ0gs to a broader, more
technology-neutral category.?f 'electronic communicatio~s.' During the proc~ss,
how~,:er, the Council of Ministers began to .push for the inclusion of data retention
PrOVIsions, requiring the Internet Service Providers and telecommunications operators to
store logs of alI telephone calls e-mails faxes and Internet activity for law enforcement
~urposes. These proposals were' strongly op'p~se~ by !llost members of the Parliament. In
d~ly 2001, the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee approved the draft
Irective without data retention.
1. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Comm'!nication.s, 200~/581EC (July !2, 2002) (~on~erning the
processing of personal data and the protectIOn of privacy In the Electronic commumcation sector)
(available in LEXIS at 2002 OJ L 201).
2. ld. at art. 5.
3. ld. at art. 6.
4. ld. at art. 15( I).
5. Directive 97/66IEC (repealed).
6. Supra n. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Electronic Privacy Information Centre, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of
Privacy Laws and Developments 11 (EPIC: US 2002).
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The events of September 11, however, have changed the political climate. The Parliament
came under increasing pressure from the Member States to adopt the Council's proposal
for data retention. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in particular, questioned
whether the privacy policy rules still struck 'the right balance between privacy and the
needs of the law enforcement agencies in the light of the battle against terrorism.' The
Parliament stood firm and up to a few weeks before the final vote on May 30, 2002, the
majority of MEPs opposed any form ~f data retention. Finally, after mu~h pressure .by the
European Council and European. Um0l! .govem":lents, and well-organized lobbymg by
two Spanish MEPs, the two mam political parties (PPE and PSE, the centre-left and
centre-right parties) reached a deal to vote in favour of the Council's position. 10
The initiatives, in fact, began immediately after September 11. Nine days after the tragic
event, the European Commission requested the Council of the EU to submit proposals ~or
ensuring that law enforcement. aut~orities are able to investigate criminal acts i!lvolvm.g
the use of electronic communications systems and to take legal measures agamst then
perpetrators. 11 At a specially called meeting of the EU's Justice and Home Affairs, the
Council adopted a series of 'Conclusions' which included requiring service providers to
retain traffic data and for legal enforcement authorities to have access to it "for the
purposes of criminal investigations." 12 Only two weeks before this request, the EUropean
Parliament recommended in a resolution that "a general data retention principle must be
forbidden" and that "any ~eneral obligation concerning data retention" is contrary to the
proportionality principle.
The external pressure from the United States came in the form of forty demands on the
EU. In a letter dated October 16, 2001 to the President of the European Commission,
President Bush requested that the EU consider data protection issues in the context of law
enforcement and counter-terrorism imperatives and to revise draft privacy directive that
call for mandatory destruction to permit the retention of critical data for a reasonable
period. 14 Understandably, the group of eight Justices and Interior Ministers (G8), in
May 2002, made similar requests:
States should examine their policies concerning the availability of traffic data
and subscriber information so that a balance is struck between the protection of
privacy, industry'S considerations and law enforcement's fulfillment of the
public safety mandate. Data protection policies should strike a balance between
the protections of personal data, industry'S considerations such as network
security and fraud prevention, and law enforcement's needs to conduct
investigations to combat crime and terrorist activities. 1::>
A policy document from the G8 states, "to the extent that data protection legislation
continues to permit the retention of data only for billing purposes, such a position would
10. Id. at 12.
11. Statewatch News Online, EU Governments Want the Retention of all Telecommunications Datafor
General Use by Law Enforcement Agencies Under Terrorism Plan,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001lsep/20authoritarian.html (accessed July 28, 2004).
12. See Statewatch News Online, Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Jus/ice and Home Affairs), 3,
http://www.statewatch.org/newsl200 1/sep/03926-r6.pdf (accessed July 28, 2004).
13. Clive Walker & Yaman Akdeniz, Anti-terrorism Laws and Data retention: War is Over?, 54 N.
Ireland Leg. Q. [No.2) (citing 167 Extraordinary Council meeting, Justice, Home Affairs and Civil
Protection, Brussels (Sept. 20, 2001».
14. There is no similar obligation for the general retention of data in the U.S. even after the passing of
the U.S.A. Pa/ri~t Ac/. When debating the passage of the Act, the U.S. Congress repeatedly rejected
a full data retention approach.
15. Department of Justice Canada, G8 Statement: Principles on the Availability of Data Essential to
Protecting Public Safety, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/enlnews/g8/doc3.html (Feb. 5,2004).
over.look crucial legitimate societal interests - particularly when applied to the Internet
service provider area, where flat rate pricing and free Internet and E-mail services
foreclose the need to retain traffic data for billing purposes - and thereby seriously
hamper public safety" .16
III. Data Retention: The Legal Framework in the UK
The.Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 ("ATCSA"), in Part 11, is specifically
dedIcated to the retention of communications data. 17 Sections 102-107 .xive power to the
Secr~tary of State to ensure that communications providers retain data. ns Section 102(1)
prOVIdesthat the Secretary of State shall issue, and may from time to time revise, a code
of practice relating to the retention by communications providers of communications data
?btained by or held by them. 19 Under subsection (2), the Secretary of State may enter
into such agreements as he considers appropriate with any communications provider
about the practice to be followed by that provider in relation to the retention of
communications data obtained by or held by that provider. 20
Any code of practice or agreement may contain provisions that appears to the Secretary
of State to be necessary, a) for the purpose of safeguarding national security; or
(b) .for the purposes of prevention or detection of crime or the prosecution of offenders
whIch may relate directly or indirectly to national secunty. 21
The procedure for making the code of conduct of practice is governed by Section 103.
The Secretary of State is required to publish the code in draft and to consider any
recommendations about the draft.22 He is specifically required to consult with the
Information Commissioner and with communication service providers to whom the code
will apply)3 He is then to lay the draft code before Parliament.24 The code is to be
brought into force by statutory instrument, which is to be approved by Parliament under
the affirmative resolution procedure. 25
Failure to comply with the code of practice or agreement .sh~1lnot in .a~d of itself render
the communications service providers liable for any c~lm.mal.or c~vII pro~eedmgs.26
However, a code of practice or agreement shall be admissible in evidence ~nany legal
proceedings in which the question arises [as to] ~hether th~ retention of any
c.ommunications data is justified on the grounds that .a failure to re~amthe da!a would be
hkely to prejudice national security, the. prevent~on or det.ectIOn of .cr~~~ or the
prosecution of offenders.27 This subsection prOVIdes a baSIS of admissibility of a
voluntary code of practice or agreement to p~ote~t any communications provider in t~e
even! that the retention of data is sought t~ be Justified ~n the gr~)Undsof national secunty
or cnme prevention, detection or prosecutIOnon the baSISof national secunty.
16. Department of Justice Canada. GB Statement on Data Protection Regimes,
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/enlnews/g8/doc5.html (Feb. 2, 20~4).
17. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act ss 102-107 (200 1) [heremafter ATCSA J.
18. Jbid.
19. Jd at s 102(1).
20. Jd at s ]02(2).
2]. Jd at s 102(3).
22. Jd at s 103(1).
23. Jd at s 103(2).
24. Id. at s ]03(4).
25. Jd at sI03(5), (7).
26. Jd. at s 102(4).
27. /dats ]02(5).
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In the event that voluntary scheme fails, section 104 of the ATCSA empowers the
Secretary of State to issue a direction.28 Under this section, the Secretary of State ll?ay
issue a direction by order made by statutory instrument, specifying the maximum penod
that communications service providers may be required to retain data.29 The power to
issue such an order is only to be exercised if, after reviewing the operation of any Code or
agreement under section 102, the Secretary of State considers it to be necessary to do
so.30 Such an order may only be made for the statutory purposes prescribed in section
102(3).31 Accordingly, the legislation envisages that the Secretary of State must fi~st
seek to achieve a workable system of voluntary data retention for national secunty
purposes and only if that fails adequately to meet those objectives may he resort to
compulsory powers. As with the Code, there are statutory consultation requirements, but
these do not include the Commissioner.32
The ATCSA provides for the retention. of data for the purposes of safeguarding national
security or for the prevention or detection of cnme or the prosecution of offences, which
relates directly or indirectly to national security. Meanwhile, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA") permits a range of public authorities to obtain
access to such communications ~at~~oTa wide variety of public interest purposes q,eyond
issues concernmg national secunty. .
IV. Criticism
The Electronic Privacy Information Centre ("EPIC") argues that the implementation
phase of the data retention provision may become bumpy in many EU countries:34
"While a few countries have already established data retention schemes (e.g.
Belgium, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom), the implementation phase of
the Directive's data retention provision" may not be smooth in other Member
States principally because the Directive could be considered as being in conflict
with the constitutions of some EU countries35 with respect to fundamental rights,
such as the presumption of innocence, right to privacy, confidentiality of
communications and freedom of expression. 30
The Global Internet Liberty Campaign ("GILC"), a coalition of 60 civil liberties groups,
[that] organized a campaign against data retention during the debate of the Directive,
argues that "data retention ... is contrary to well-established international human rights
28. Id. at s 104.
29. ld. at s 104(1).
30. Ibid.
3 L Ibid.
32. See ATCSA s 104(4).
33. Ben Emmerson QC & Helen Mountfield, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Retention
and Disclosure of Communications Data: Summary of Councils' Advice, para 4,
http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/uk/surveillance/ic·terror-opinion.html
(accessed Apr. 30, 2004).
34. Electronic Privacy Information Center Data Retention,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/intlldataretention.html (last updated Mar. 25,2004).
35. The Austrian Federal Constitutional Court held on Feb 27 2003 that the statute that compelled
telecom~u~ication service providers to implement wiretapping measures at their own expense is
unconstitutional,
36. Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/inWdataretention.html
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conventions and case law.,,37
The .Data Protection Commissioners in the EU and their officials, who attended a
~~~tIt~de of working parties meetings have long been aware of the data retention
InltJatlve.38 Their spring conference in Stockholm, April 6-7, 2000, issued a declaration
on the 'Retention of Traffic Data by Internet Service Providers,' stating:
Such retention would be an improper invasion of the fundamental rights
g~aranteed to individuals by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
RIghts. Where traffic data are to be retained in specific cases, there must be
demonstrable need, the period of retentio.n.must be as short as possible and the
practice must be clearly regulated by law.:';~
Again,. on September 11, 2002, during the international conference of data protection
commIssioners in Cardiff, the European Data Protection Commissioner released a
declaration that strongly warned against any future EU-wide mandatory and systematic
data retention scheme. The Commissioners expressed "grave doubt as to the legitimacy
and legality of such broad measures.,,40
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") based its criticisms on consumers'
pnvacy concern and confidence, as weB as the unreasonable cost and technical burdens
on the te1coms and ISPs.41 According to the ICC, "public concern about the privacy of
communications and activities on the Internet has been widely expressed in the context of
proposals for mandatory traffic data retention, and it is unlikely to diminish as more
cou.ntries consider legislation."42 The ICC also questioned the need for the data retention
reglm~ as the data kept for billing p'urpose can be used by the law enforcement
agencI.es.43 The ICC has issued a U~1icy statement to warn governments agamst the;mergmg traffic data retention laws. It .recom1!lend~J~at governments should favour
argeted data preservation over data retentIon regImes.
The European Internet Services Providers Association ("EuroISPA") and the US Internet
Service Provider Association ("USISPA") urge all governments to undertake a serious
bost benefit analysis of the impact of applying mandatory data retention requirementsefore. moving forward in this area. This should be accomp.anied ~y equally se~ious
analYSIS ~nd comparison of alternative ~egulatory approaches, m part~cular,. that .of d~ta
preservatIon'. The ISP industry is convmced that the later approach, m conjunctIon WIth
appropriate use of data managed by ISPs for the security of their services, is the right and
only way forward.46 The EuroISPA and USISPA argue that:
37. Ibid.38. Statewatch, EU Governments to Give Law Enforcement Agencies Access to All Communications
Data, htt :/Iwww.statewatch.or Inews/2001lma 103Benfo ol.html (accessed Apr. 29,
2004).
39. Ibid.40. See Foundation for Information Policy Research, Statement of the European Data Protection
Commissioners at the International Conference in Cardiff (~-ll. September 2002) on mandatory
systematic retention of telecommumcatlOn traffic data,
http://www.fiPr.orglpressl0209IlDataCommissioners.html (accessed Oct. 29, 2004).
41. See ICC, "Don't Play Big Brother" is l!usiness Plea .~o G~vern,!,ents:on Internet Traffic,
htt :/IwwW.iccwbo.or/home/newsarchlVes/2002/stoueslblblother.as (Nov. 29,
2002).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.44. ICC, Policy Statement: Storage of Traff!c Data for Law Enforcement Purposes,
htt :I/www.iccwbo.or Ihome/e business/ ohc 1373-22-106E. df(Nov. 18,2002).
45. ld. at 1.46. EUROISPA and USISPA Position on the Impact of Data Retention Laws on the Fight Against
8Mandatory data retention is an extreme step. Governments have not sufficiently
demonstrated that the absence of mandatory data retention is detrimental to the
public interests. In countries like the United States, where there is no.mandatory
aata retention, the law enforcement agencies routmely obtam the evidence they
need. Th~ US law enforcement has also endorsed data preservation as workable
solution. 7
Data retention, according to these organizations, would be a major blow to the current
European legal framework on data protecti?n. [The] in~ustry. is extremely. concerned t~at
the issue of pnvacy seems to be raised mamly when discussing the duration of ~etentlOn
and not its scope. 4~ They argue that mandatory data retention by ISPs - for which there
is no business purpose - would impose serious technical, legal and financial burdens on
them.49 It will put much personal information at risk of accidental disclosure or
intentional misuse, and data preservation is a significantly less radical and currently
available solution for evidence-gathering tool. 50
The EuroISPA and USISPA further assert:
ISPs find that there is no compelling or convincing evidence of greater efficiency
benefits for law enforcement with the data retention approach ..... Mandatory
data retention is a drastic step that should not be taken unless drastic alternatives
have been tested and proven mad equate. 5)
The All Party Internet Group ("APIG") in its 2003 report, states, "in some people's view,
Parliament was mistaken and the retention of communications data, even for reasons of
national security, is not proportionate and therefore not 'human rights compliant.",52 It
argues:
In view of the clear evidence presented to us of its inevitable failure, we can see
nothing to be gained from the spectacle of seeing a voluntary scheme proposed,
approved by Parliament and then being ignored by the communications service
providers. We can reach no other conclusion than to recommend that the Home
Office immediately dr01?>Jheir plans to introduce a voluntary scheme for data
retention under ATCSA.
Mandatory data retention scheme, according to the APIG, will do immense harm to the
industry and. will not actually a~hieve the !esults wished for by Law Enforcement. 54 It
does not beheve that It IS practical to retam all communications data on the off chance
that it will be useful one day.55 It believes that the moves in other EU states towards a
data retention policy are entirely mistaken. It urgently recommends that the Government
enter into Europe-wide discussion to dismantle data retention regimes and to ensure that
data preservation becomes EU policy.56
The FIPR believes that the creation of warehouses of communications data will lead to
Cybercrime, http://www.euroispa.org/docs/020930eurousispa dretent.pdf ( ept. 30 2002).
47. Ibid. (emphasis original). '
48. Id. at 2.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51 Ibid. at 1,3.
52. Id at 20, para 134.
53 ld at 22, para 141.
54 ld. at 27, para 177.
55 Ibid
56. Ibid.
significant abuses of the individual's rights. 57 It argues that "it is predictable that
excuses ~i!l be found to trawl through them looking for patt~rns of behaviour or patterns
of a~S~CIatlO!l' S.uch warehouses are exactly the tools needed to create a totalitarian state
and It IS foohsh m the extreme to create them.,,58 '
V. Privacy vs. Security
The Home Office, in recognising the relationship between privacy and freedom, states:
"We value our privacy. We value our freedom. In the same way our freedom is
balanced against society's rules, our privacy has to be balanced against the needs
of society for preventing and detecting crime.,,59
On the other hand, in achieving. the twin objecti.ves of. enhancing privacy and making
better use of personal data to dehver smarter pubhc services, the Government insists that
!t will opt for the least intrusive approach.60 This means that where it "can achieve
Improvements in services or efficiency without requiring more information and affecting
personal privacy, it should do so."61 The Government pledges that it will consider
alternative approaches that have a lesser impact on privacy in achieving the objectives. 62
After all, the grotection of privacy, according to the Government, is in and of itself a
public service. ~3
"The tragic terrorist attacks against the United States have highlighted the necessity for
democratic societies to engage in the fight against terrorism. This objective is both a
necessary and valuable element of democratic societies. In this fight, certain conditions
~ave to be respected which also form part of the basis of the democratic societies.,,64
Measures against terrorism should not and need not reduce standards of protection of
fun~amental rights which characterises democra~ic societies. A key element of the fight
agamst terrorism involves ensuring the preservatIon of these fundamental values that are
t~e basis of the democratic societies and the very values that those advocating the use of
VIolence seek to destroy.,,65 "There is a!1 increasing t~ndency t? re~~esent the protection
of personal data as a barrier to the efficient fight agamst terronsrn, 66 As stated by the
EU Working Party, "terrorism is not a new p~enomenon and cannot ~ qualified as a
temporary phenomenon.,,67 And legislation IS not the only weapon m the counter-
terrorism armory, nor is it the most important.
In considering data retention measures, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to
57. See FIPR's comments submitted to the APIG inquiry, 2, http://www.apig.org.uk/fipr.pdf
(accessed Oct. 29,2004).
58. Ibid.59. Home Office, Access to Communication Data: Respecting Privacy and Protecting the Public from
Crime. A Consultation Paper http://www.homeoffice.gov.ukldocslconsult.pdf (M~. 2003).
60. Cabinet Office, Privacy and Data-sharing: The Way !,orward jor Public ~ervlces, Apr. 8, 2002
(available at htt :llwww.number-lO. ov.uk/sul nvac /downloads/ Iu-data. df (accessed
July 29, 2(04».
61. Id at 5.
62. Id. at6.
63. Id. at 5.64. Article 29 _ ata Protection Working Party, Opinion 1012001: On the Need jor a. Balanced
Approach in the Fight Against Terrorism. 2 (Dec. 14, 2001) (available at
http://W\ ....w. tatewat h.orginewsl2002ZianlwP53en.pdf(accessed Nov. 1,2004».
65. 1d at 4.
66. Ibid.
67 Id at .
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be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a
whole. In striking the required balance, the Court in Hatton v. UK.,68 held that the states
must have regard to the whole range of material considerations:
States are required to minimise, as far .as possible, the interference with these
rights, by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve
their aims in the least onerous way as regards human rights. In order to do that, a
proper and complete investigetion and study with the aim of finding the best
possible solution, w~ch will, In reahty, strike the right balance should precede
the relevant project.
Applying this test to all aspects of respect for private life (and not just in the field of
environmental protection), it can be argued that the question of whether the state has
carried out a thorough review of the laws concerning the protection of national security,
as well as the prevention and detection of crime, before venturing into data retention is
very relevant. The question of whether any alternative means are available which would
minimise any interference with the rights of Article 8 is important. Itmust be emphasised
that the right balance that must be struck here is not only between the competing interest
of the individual against the interest of the community but also the interest of the
community as a whole, to be protected against crime as well as against surveillance.
VII. Legal Challenge
The EU network of independent experts in fundamental rights ("CRF-DF") published a
thematic comment, The Balance between Freedom and Security in the Response by the
European Union and its Member States to the Terrorist Threat, on March 31, 2003.10
The report states that the independent experts on fundamental rights are, in fact,
convinced that the effectiveness of steps to fight terrorism cannot be measured by the
extent of restrictions which these steps impose on fundamental freedoms.71 In other
words, the increase in security is not inversely proportional to the restriction of freedom;
on the contrary, certain practices minimise the scope of restrictions on fundamental rights
whilst offering a high level of effectiveness. 72 The report concludes:
International law on .human rights is not opposed to States taking measures to
protect against terrorist threat. But as a counterpart to restrictions that the States
adopt to respond to that threat, it must imagine mechanisms by which the
consequences for the guarantee of individual freedoms are limited to a strict
minimum. In particular, independent control mechanisms must be provided that
can c?':lnter possible abuse by the Executive or the criminal {Jrosecution
authorities. I!1addition, restrictions Imposed on individual freedoms In response
to the ~erronst threat must be limited to what is absolutely necessary. These
restncnons were adopted to cope with an immediate threat, but one that is not
necessarily permanent, and as such, they should be of a temporary character and
be assessed regularly under some kind of mechanism. They should be targeted
sufficiently precisely and not affect other phenomena or possibly other categories
of persons, on the pretext of terrorist threat.73
Article 15 of the Electronic Privacy Directive allows data retention measures where
68. [2001] European ct. of Human Rights 36022/97 (Oct 2 2001) (availabl at (2001) HR
36022/97). . ,
69. ld.at para 97
70. EU N~tw?rk of Independence Experts in Fundamental Rights, Th Balance Betw n Fre dom and
Security In the Response by the European Union and it Member tote 10 III Terrori I ThrealS
(Mar. 31,2003).
71 Ibid
n Id. at 10.
73. ld. at 52.
"necessa~, appropriate, and pro~ortionate" ,,:i~hina democratic society.74 The Directive
onl~ permits retention measures If these C0!ldlh.onscould be satisfied within a democratic
society. The Member States may take legislative measures providing for data retention
only if is necessary, appropriate. and p~oportionate.75 I~is imperative for the government
to demonstrate that data retentlOn satisfies those requirements, This means that proper
assessments of the necessity, appropriateness and proportionality of the data retention
legislative measures have to be carried out. There is also a need to assess whether less
intrusive and less costly measures, such as data 'preservation, might effectively achieve
what the data retention regime seeks to achieve.76
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") encompasses the right
to be oneself, to live as oneself and to keep to oneself. 77 In the leading case of Niemitz v.
Germ_any,78 the cO';lrtpronounced that respect for p:ivate. life .must also comprise, to
certain degr~e, the ng~t to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.
The Court m Z v. Fmland79 has asserted that the protection of personal data is of
fundamental importance of a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for privacy
and family life under Article 8.
As already mentioned, many argue that the UK's data retention regimes constitute an
mterference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence enshrined in
Article 8. The Government seems to admit this.80 Relying on Article 8(2), the
Government, interestingly, argues that communications data retention will be in
accordance with the [ECHR,] provided that the retention periods are proportionate to the
legitimate aims being pursued.81 The Government also argues that in the ATCSA,
"Parliament concluded that the retention of communications data was necessary for the
Purposes set out" and the "draft Code of Practice sets out the retention periods for
different types 'of communications data that the Sec!eta~ o~ State considers
proportionate.,,82 Simply, the Government sees proportionality m the context of
retention periods. The real issue is not so much ?n t~e retention periods, but ~hether .the
laws allowing the retention and the act of retentlOn Itself are proportlOnate with the alms
~eing pursued. As stated by the European Commi~sioners for data protection,
Systematic retention of all kinds of traffic data for a penod of one year or more would
74. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002/581EC at Art. 15. (July 12,2002).
75. ibid.76. The current practice in Europe is that comJ!lunication operators. work closely wi~h law enforcement
agencies, police forces, and other natIOnal ~gencles.. This cooperatIOn .mc~udes real-tJ~e
interception of communications and the preservatIOn and disclosure of com~umcatlOns da~ that. IS
routinely collected for legitimate busines~ purposes. Indeed, the efforts of industry to assist with
criminal and anti-terrorist investigations since September 11, 2001 h~ve been praised by many ~m
governments. The current cooperation between law ~nf~rcement ~d md~stry has proven effective.
There have been very few occasions when commumcatlOns service providers have been unable to
satisfy a request to disclose data because the data had already been. deleted .. I~ the current
cooperation between law enforcement and indust~ h~ been and IS effectJv~,.then It IS eve~ more
imperative to demonstrate the application of the directive data storage prOVISionbe 'prop?,rtlO~~te,
neces ary and justified. See American Chamber of Commerce to the European Umon, Position
Paper on Data Retention in the EV," (June 4, 2003). . .
77. Lord Le ter of Heme Hill & David Pannick, Human Rights: Law and Practice ~1999).
78. 16 uropean Human Rights Rep., para 29 (1992).
79. 25 uropean Human Rights Rep. 371, para 95 (1998). ..'80 Th th h t ti n of communications data by commumcatlOns service
. • 0 e!'Tlment tates .at t e re en 10 ond the eriods that they would otherwise hold it for
pro~lders 10 ac ordance With the C:ode beYd Art' r 8 of the ECHR; See Consultation Paper on abu 10 purpo c may engage the TIghtsun er IC~ .
ode of Practic ~ r Voluntary Retention ofCommuOlcatlOns Data.
81 ld. at 10, para 7.7 (cmph' added).
82 Id. tlO,para7 ..
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be clearly disproportionate and therefore unacceptable in any case.,,83
Article 8(2) acknowledges that interference by the State is justified provided it is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society. 84 Article 8(2) has been
given a narrow interpretation. The European Court of Human Rights i~ the case o~ !Class
v. Fed. Republic of Germany85 stated that "powers of secret surveIllance of cinzens,
characterizing as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so
far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.,,86
'In accordance with law' does not merely refer to the existence of domestic law but also
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law. 87 The
Court in the case of Amann v. Switzerland88 reiterated this requirement of quality of law
and held that the legal basis must be accessible and foreseeable. What makes a law
foreseeable is the extent to which it distinguishes between different classes of people,
thereby placing a limit on arbitrary enforcement by the authorities. Thus, in Kruslin v.
France, the Court found that a law authorizing telephone tapping lacked the requisite
foreseeability because it nowhere defined the categories of people liable to have their
telephones tapped or the nature of the offences which might justify such surveillance. In
Amman v. Switzerland, the Court reached the same conclusion with regard to a decree
permitting the police to conduct surveillance because the decree gave no indication of the
persons subject to surveillance or the circumstances in which it could be ordered. Data
retention laws that fail to distinguish between different classes of people would have a
more pernicious impact on individual privacy than the vague laws at issue in Kruslin and
Amann. 89
The Court in Kopp v. Switzerlan~O held that the telephone tapping law failed to meet
the standard of foreseeability because it provided no guidance on how authorities should
distinguish between protected and unprotected attorney-client communications.91 The
data retention regulations suffer from the same flaw.
Article 8(2) allows interference. However, it must be for a legitimate aim and necessary
in a democratic society.92 The test of necessity involves deciding whether there is a
"'pressing social need'" for the interference and whether the means employed are
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the State."93 In conducting such an
examination, it is the nature, context and importance of the right asserted and the extent
of interference that must be balanced against the nature, context and importance of the
public interest asserted as justification.
As ~he Court men~ioned in l!atton, stat~s are required to minimise, as much as possible,
the mterference with the Article 8(2)'s rights by trying to find alternative solutions and by
generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous way. Privacy International
83. Supra n. 41.
84. Privacy Inte~ational, Memorandum of Laws Concerning the Legality of Data Retention with regard
to the Rlg~ts .Guarm~teed by the European Convention on Human Rights, 8,
http://vAvw.pnvacymternational.org/issuesiterrorismJrptldata retcnti n mem .pdf( t. 10,2003).
85. 2 European Human Rights Rep. 214 (1979). -
86. Id. at 231.
87. Privacy International, op cit.
88. 30 European Iluman Rights Rep. 843 (2000).
89. Supra n. 84 at 8-9
90. 27 EHRR 91 (1998).
91. Supra n 84 at 9.
92. Ibid
93 Id. at 9-10.
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argu~s that "Article 8(2)'s limi~ede~cep~!on requires that any interference be no greater
than ISne~essary 10 a democratic s?clety. ~4 For a measure "to be proportional, the State
must put I~glace safeguards ensunng that interference with those rights is no greater than
nece~sary. 5 Mandatory data retention laws, accord 109 to the Privacy International, "fail
on this score as well.,,96
The Government argues that proportionality depends on assessment of three things·
~'de~ee ?f intrusion into an individual's private life .involved; strength of public I?olicy
justification; [and the] adequacy of the safeguards 10 place to prevent abuse.,,97 The
Government should be reminded of its own Guidance, jointly produced with the Bar
Council. The proportionality test is defined as follows:
Even if a particular policy or action, which interferes with the Convention right,
pursues a legitimate aim (such as the prevention of crime) this WIllnot justify the
interference If the means used to achieve the aim are excessive in the
circumstances. Any interference with a Convention right should be carefully
designed to 11.l(~etthe objective in question and must not be arbitrary or unfair.
Public authorities must not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Even takinr all
these considerations into account, inteiference in a particular case may stil not
be justified because the impact on the individual or group is just too severe. 9
Simply, the means must not be arbitrary or unfair and excessive in the circumstances. The
Impact on the individual or group must not be too severe. It can be argued that the data
retention measures, which involve the generali~ed and systematic surveillance of
electronic communications of all users, can be arbitrary, unfair and excessive. It is also
disproportionate. The impact on society is also too severe because the states can now
lawfully require blanket surveillance of the electronic communication of the entire
population. Arguably, the data retention regime may not be able to survive the
proportionality test.
The Court in Kopp held unanimously that there h~d been a violation of Article 8.99 The
concurring opinion of Judge Pettiti deserves attentIOn:
It is regrettable fact that state, para-state and private bodies a~e making
increasing use of the interceptIon of tele'p~one .and other communication for
various purposes. In Europe so-called administrative telephone monitoring ISnot
generally subject to an adequate system or level of protectIOn.... The .European
~0':lT!has clearly laid down in its.case ~awthe ~eq~lrement of ~upervlslon by the
judicial authorities in a democratiC soc!ety, which IScharacterized by the.rule of
law, with the attendant guarantees of mdependence and impartiality; this IS all
the more important in order to meet ~e. threat posed by new technologies .. : .
Where monitoring is ordered by a Judlcl.al authority, even where there, IS v.ah~
basis in law, it must be used for a speclfi,? pUrPose, not as a general fishmg
exercise to bring in information .... The leglsI~tIon of numerous European ~tat~s
fails to comply with Article 8 of the ConventIOnwhere. the telephone tappmg _Is
concerned. States use _ or abuse - the concepts of official secrets and secrecy 10
the interests of national security, where necessary, they distort the n:teanmg and
nature of that term. Some clarification of what these concepts mean ISneeded 10
order to refine and improve the system for the prevention of terrorism. 100
VIII. Conclusions
Data retention is, indeed, a critical and delicate issue. It affects and impacts, significantly,
directly or indirectly, individuals, society as a whole, industry and e-commerce. Data
retention legal regimes may be contested as contravening the fundamental rights under
Article 8(1) of the ECHR and it may not be justified under Article 8(2). Obviously, and
logically, the views, comments and concerns of all stakeholders are too important to be
ignored.
The right balance to be struck is between the right of the society to be protected from
crime and terrorism on one hand and the right of the society and entire population to
privacy and to be free from constant surveillance on the other. In this respect, it is even
arguable whether Article 8(2) can be relied upon by the state to justify the data retention
legislation. The authorities may make a claim along the lines that 'only the guilty have to
fear'. Perhaps, this is a misunderstanding of the meaning of privacy. Privacy is about the
right of individuals to go about their lawful activity without interference. Privacy is also
the fundamental element for the activities on the Internet. 101
).
100. Ibid. (Pettiti, J., concurring).
101. E.g. World Summit on the Information Society, Declaration of Principles, S,
http://heiwww.unige.ch/-c1apham/hrd<?c/d?cslworldi~fodecl.pdf (Dec. 12, 2003) (regarded
strengthening the trust framework, which mcludes pnvacy, as a prerequisite for the development of
the Information Society and for building confidence among user of ICTs).
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Abstract
Contrary to initial hopes, the increased economic, social-cultural and political im-
portance of cyberspace has led to substantial state regulation of it. Since nation
states are still the dominant force here, the regulation of trans border data flows
requires the cooperation of nation states which encounters many difficulties.
These problems can be analysed along two dimensions: on the one hand, there are
competing interests in the field of transborder data flows: economic interests centre
on issues like cost-effectiveness; safety interests focus on the reduction of risk and
the prevention of misuse; and civil liberty interests call for the upholding of pri-
vacy and freedom of information. On the other hand, national environments differ
considerably, especially with respect to the values that inform political debate; the
direction and mobilisation of interests; and the existence of institutions in relevant
areas such as data protection.This paper uses these two dimensions to analyse two illustrative cases: one is the
"Safe Harbor" agreement between the U.S. and the EU that was meant to provide a
framework for firms in the face of different standards of private sector data protec-
tion between the two areas; the other is the recent dispute between the U.S. and the
EU about the transmission of airline passengers' personal data. The paper argues
that these cases demonstrate that initial expectations for a "policy transfer" of EU
privacy standards to the U.S. did not materialise, and that differences in institutions
and underlying values can largely account for this.
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